October 9, 2006

Latest DOL/FLSA Opinion Letter

This is in response to your request for an opinion concerning the application of the administrative exemption under section 13(a)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (copy enclosed), and the implementing regulations at 29 C.F.R. Part 541 (copy enclosed), to certain employees employed as mortgage loan officers.  Based on the analysis below, it is our opinion that the mortgage loan officers you describe are exempt administrative employees.

You state that, in the industry, other job titles for referring to mortgage loan officers include “mortgage loan representatives,” “mortgage loan consultants,” “mortgage loan originators,” “mortgage bankers,” and similar titles.  Our response collectively refers to all such employees as “mortgage loan officers.”  Please note, however, that an employee’s exempt status is not determined based on job title or job classification; rather, it is determined by analyzing each particular employee’s actual job duties and compensation under the applicable regulations.  “The exempt or nonexempt status of any particular employee must be determined on the basis of whether the employee’s salary and duties meet the requirements of the regulations in this part.”  29 C.F.R. § 541.2.

You indicate that mortgage loan officers work under various business models and their duties vary accordingly.  The particular mortgage loan officers in your request spend the majority of their working time inside their employer’s place of business (or inside the employees’ offices located in their homes), although some also may meet with customers or referral sources such as realtors or builders away from the office.  Your request specifically does not address mortgage loan officers who are customarily and regularly engaged away from their employer’s place(s) of business (or away from their home offices) who may be considered for possible exemption under the outside sales exemption defined at 29 C.F.R. § 541.500. [1]   In addition, employees who spend the majority of their time inside the office prospecting for potential customers who have not previously expressed an interest in obtaining information about a mortgage loan (e.g., employees in a call center environment primarily selling financial products as “outbound telemarketers”) are outside the scope of your request.  Further, “loan processors,” who coordinate appraisals and title work and review the customers’ supporting financial documents (e.g., pay stubs, W-2s, bank statements, and tax returns for self-employed individuals) to determine whether they meet the documentation requirements associated with the mortgage loan, are also specifically outside the scope of your request.

You describe the primary duties of the mortgage loan officers as follows.  Mortgage loan officers work with the employer’s customers to assist them in identifying and securing a mortgage loan that is appropriate for their individual financial circumstances and is designed to help them achieve their financial goals, including home ownership.  Mortgage loan officers respond to and follow up on customer inquiries (sometimes referred to as “leads”) that come from several sources.  The loan officer will collect and analyze the customer’s financial information and assess the customer’s financial circumstances to determine whether the customer and the property qualify for a particular loan.  This involves inquiries into the customer’s income, assets, investments, debt, credit history, prior bankruptcies, judgments, and liens, as well as characteristics of the property and similar information.  The loan officer will also advise the customer about the risks and benefits of the loan alternatives, including the options and variables involved.  Many mortgage banking companies offer multiple mortgage products, resulting in hundreds of loans to choose from, requiring specific analysis, evaluation, and advice from the loan officers.  Loan officers must also stay up-to-date on changes in market conditions.

Additionally, some loan officers use technological tools to help them serve their customer’s needs.  For example, loan officers may use computer software to assist in the underwriting process by helping evaluate whether the customer qualifies for the loan.  These products assist the loan officer in communicating a loan prequalification, loan pre-approval, or qualified loan approval.  You emphasize, however, that these tools do not substitute for the discretion and judgment required of the loan officer; and the loan officer is responsible for recommending the best products for the customer.

 
You describe the sales component of the mortgage loan officer’s duties, i.e., when he or she spends time selling mortgage loan products to customers, as “customer-specific persuasive sales activity, such as encouraging an individual potential customer to do business with his or her employer’s mortgage banking company rather than a competitor, or to consider the possibility of a mortgage loan if they have not expressed prior interest.”  You contrast this sales activity with “marketing, servicing or promoting the employer’s financial products,” which you describe as the marketing of the employer’s mortgage banking company or products generally, as well as the promotion of brand awareness and the creation of demand among realtors, builders, developers, and other entities.  You state that both the customer-specific persuasive sales activity and the more general marketing or promoting activities may take place during the same discussion with the customer.  You ask that we assume for purposes of responding to your request that less than 50 percent of the mortgage loan officer’s working time over a representative period is spent on customer-specific persuasive sales activity.

You acknowledge in your request that the administrative exemption requires payment on a salary or fee basis at a rate of not less than $455 per week.  While you do not specify the particular compensation arrangements for the mortgage loan officers in question, you ask that we assume in responding to your request that they are paid on a salary basis at a rate of at least $455 per week.

You seek an opinion on three questions:  (1) whether the principles for determining whether employees in the financial services industry are administratively exempt under the new regulations also apply under the prior regulations; (2) whether the mortgage loan officers described above meet the administrative duties test set forth for employees in the financial services industry as an example of the administrative exemption in 29 C.F.R. § 541.203(b); and (3) whether employees in the financial services industry who meet the duties requirements as described in section 541.203(b) exercise sufficient discretion and independent judgment even though they may use certain underwriting software programs or tools.

In response to your first question, FLSA section 13(a)(1) provides an exemption from the minimum wage and overtime provisions for “any employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity,” as those terms are defined in 29 C.F.R. Part 541.  An employee may qualify for exemption if all the regulatory tests relating to duties and salary are met.  The regulations were revised effective August 23, 2004 (69 Fed. Reg. 22,122 (Apr. 23, 2004)).  Because the criteria in the duties test for the administrative exemption in the 2004 revised final regulations are substantially the same as under the prior rule, the outcome of this opinion would be essentially identical under either version of the regulations.  See Robinson-Smith v. Gov’t Employees Ins. Co., 323 F. Supp. 2d 12 (D.D.C. 2004); McLaughlin v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. Civ. 02-6205-TC, 2004 WL 1857112 (D. Or. 2004).

Regarding your second question, under 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a), “[t]he term ‘employee employed in a bona fide administrative capacity’ in section 13(a)(1) of the Act” means “any employee”:

(1)  Compensated on a salary or fee basis at a rate of not less than $455 per week . . . , exclusive of board, lodging or other facilities;

(2)  Whose primary duty is the performance of office or non-manual work directly related to the management or general business operations of the employer or the employer’s customers; and

(3)  Whose primary duty includes the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance.

 

Id.

Work that is “directly related to the management or general business operations” of the employer is defined as “work directly related to assisting with the running or servicing of the business, as distinguished, for example, from working on a manufacturing production line or selling a product in a retail or service establishment.”  29 C.F.R. § 541.201(a).  

“The term ‘primary duty’ means the principal, main, major or most important duty that the employee performs.  Determination of an employee’s primary duty must be based on all the facts in a particular case, with the major emphasis on the character of the employee’s job as a whole.”  29 C.F.R. § 541.700(a).  “The amount of time spent performing exempt work can be a useful guide in determining whether exempt work is the primary duty of an employee,” but time alone “is not the sole test.”  29 C.F.R. § 541.700(b).

Section 541.203 includes specific examples of occupations that would generally meet the administrative duties test, including in paragraph (b) “[e]mployees in the financial services industry.”  Such employees are ordinarily considered to meet the duties requirements for the administrative exemption if their duties include:

work such as collecting and analyzing information regarding the customer’s income, assets, investments or debts; determining which financial products best meet the customer’s needs and financial circumstances; advising the customer regarding the advantages and disadvantages of different financial products; and marketing, servicing or promoting the employer’s financial products.  However, an employee whose primary duty is selling financial products does not qualify for the administrative exemption.

29 C.F.R. § 541.203(b). [2]  The preamble to the 2004 regulations reviewed the pertinent case law drawn from the financial services industry and concluded:

The Department agrees that employees whose primary duty is inside sales cannot qualify as exempt administrative employees.  However, as found by the John Alden, Hogan and Wilshin courts, many financial services employees qualify as exempt administrative employees, even if they are involved in some selling to consumers.  Servicing existing customers, promoting the employer’s financial products, and advising customers on the appropriate financial product to fit their financial needs are duties directly related to the management or general business operations of their employer or their employer’s customers, and which require the exercise of discretion and independent judgment.

69 Fed. Reg. at 22,146 (copy enclosed).  See Reich v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997); Hogan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 361 F.3d 621 (11th Cir. 2004); Wilshin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 212 F. Supp. 2d 1360 (M.D. Ga. 2002).

You describe the duties of mortgage loan officers here as collecting and analyzing the customer’s financial information and assessing the customer’s financial circumstances to determine whether the customer and the property qualify for a particular loan.  This involves inquiries into the customer’s income, assets, investments, debt, credit history, prior bankruptcies, judgments, and liens, as well as characteristics of the property and similar information.  The loan officer will also advise the customer about the risks and benefits of the loan alternatives, including the options and variables involved.  The mortgage loan officer must analyze the information provided by the customer and advise on an array of options and variables, all of which make up the various components of the loan.

Your description of the duties of these mortgage loan officers suggests that they have a primary duty other than sales, as their work includes collecting and analyzing a customer’s financial information, advising the customer about the risks and benefits of various mortgage loan alternatives in light of their individual financial circumstances, and advising the customer about avenues to obtain a more advantageous loan program.  Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that these mortgage loan officers satisfy the duties requirement under 29 C.F.R. § 541.203(b). [3]

The mortgage loan officers also satisfy the traditional duties requirements of the administrative exemption by performing office or non-manual work directly related to the management or general business operations of the employer, and by performing duties that include the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance.  See 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a)(2)-(3).  Similar to the employees discussed in the 2004 preamble in the John Alden, Hogan, and Wilshin cases—all of whom were found to satisfy the duties requirements of the administrative exemption—the employees here service their employer’s financial services business by marketing, servicing, and promoting the employer’s financial products.  See John Alden, 126 F.3d at 8-14 (administrative exemption applied to insurance marketing representatives who represented the company to third party agents, promoted sales, and kept informed about the market to help match products with customer needs); Hogan, 361 F.3d at 626-28 (insurance agents administratively exempt who serviced and advised existing customers, adapted customer’s policies to their needs, promoted sales, and hired and trained staff among other duties); Wilshin, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1376-79 (administrative exemption applied to insurance agent who stayed knowledgeable about the market and needs of customers, recommended products to clients, provided claims help, promoted the company, and directed the day-to-day affairs of the office).

With regard to your third question, the use of software programs or tools to assess risk and to narrow the scope of products available to the customer does not necessarily disqualify the employees from the administrative exemption for lack of discretion and independent judgment.  The regulations describe the requirement of discretion and independent judgment as follows:

To qualify for the administrative exemption, an employee’s primary duty must include the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance.  In general, the exercise of discretion and independent judgment involves the comparison and the evaluation of possible courses of conduct, and acting or making a decision after the various possibilities have been considered.  The term “matters of significance” refers to the level of importance or consequence of the work performed.

29 C.F.R. § 541.202(a).

As provided in section 541.202(b):

The phrase “discretion and independent judgment” must be applied in the light of all the facts involved in the particular employment situation in which the question arises.  Factors to consider when determining whether an employee exercises discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance include, but are not limited to: whether the employee has authority to formulate, affect, interpret, or implement management policies or operating practices; whether the employee carries out major assignments in conducting the operations of the business; whether the employee performs work that affects business operations to a substantial degree, even if the employee’s assignments are related to operation of a particular segment of the business; whether the employee has authority to commit the employer in matters that have significant financial impact; whether the employee has authority to waive or deviate from established policies and procedures without prior approval; whether the employee has authority to negotiate and bind the company on significant matters; whether the employee provides consultation or expert advice to management; whether the employee is involved in planning long- or short-term business objectives; whether the employee investigates and resolves matters of significance on behalf of management; and whether the employee represents the company in handling complaints, arbitrating disputes or resolving grievances.

29 C.F.R. § 541.202(b).

Section 541.202(c) describes an employee’s exercise of discretion and independent judgment as including the authority to make an independent choice that is free from immediate direction or supervision.  However, “[t]he fact that an employee’s decision may be subject to review and that upon occasion the decisions are revised or reversed after review does not mean that the employee is not exercising discretion and independent judgment.”  Id.  Section 541.202(e) further clarifies that the “exercise of discretion and independent judgment must be more than the use of skill in applying well-established techniques, procedures or specific standards described in manuals or other sources.”  The regulations note that “[a]n employee does not exercise discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance merely because the employer will experience financial losses if the employee fails to perform the job properly.”  29 C.F.R. § 541.202(f).  Further, “[t]he use of manuals, guidelines or other established procedures containing or relating to highly technical, scientific, legal, financial or other similarly complex matters that can be understood or interpreted only by those with advanced or specialized knowledge or skills does not preclude exemption under section 13(a)(1) of the Act.”  29 C.F.R. § 541.704.  The use of “well-established techniques or procedures described in manuals or other sources within closely prescribed limits to determine the correct response to an inquiry or set of circumstances,” however, does not meet the “exercise of discretion and independent judgment” requirement.  Id.

In general, the exercise of discretion and independent judgment involves the comparison and the evaluation of possible courses of conduct, and acting or making a decision after the various possibilities have been considered.  29 C.F.R. § 541.202(a).  In your letter, you stated that some software programs display available products along with their qualification requirements, terms, and prices, many of which change on a daily or even more frequent basis.  These programs enhance the mortgage loan officer’s ability to evaluate the products, options, and variables available to determine which mortgage products might serve the customer’s needs.  So long as these programs do not select the mortgage loan product for the mortgage loan officer and the mortgage loan officer is still responsible for assessing the alternatives and making recommendations to the customer, the use of technological tools would not mean that the mortgage loan officer does not exercise the necessary discretion and independent judgment.

Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that the mortgage loan officers described above satisfy the duties requirements of the administrative exemption.

This opinion is based exclusively on the facts and circumstances described in your request and is given based on your representation, express or implied, that you have provided a full and fair description of all the facts and circumstances that would be pertinent to our consideration of the question presented.  Existence of any other factual or historical background not contained in your letter might require a conclusion different from the one expressed herein.  You have represented that this opinion is not sought by a party to pending private litigation concerning the issue addressed herein.  You have also represented that this opinion is not sought in connection with an investigation or litigation between a client or firm and the Wage and Hour Division or the Department of Labor.


Sincerely,


Paul DeCamp

Administrator

 


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October 8, 2006

State targeting abusive lenders

The Massachusetts state Division of Banks is cracking down this month on what it sees as abusive business practices by mortgage lenders and brokers.

The agency issued a series of new emergency regulations earlier this month, requiring better documentation from lenders and prohibiting them from pressuring consumers into taking out mortgages they can’t afford or working without their own independent lawyers.

It also forced four companies — two of them located Worcester — to close immediately and place all pending mortgages with another, more established lender.

Commissioner of Banks Steven L. Antonakes said in a recent interview that division examiners found a pattern of deceptive business practices by some lenders during their most recent round of company inspections.

"We want to spell out in very plain English to send a message to lenders and brokers that these specific acts, whether they’re very obviously unfair or deceptive, or more subtle, they weren’t going to be tolerated," he said. "And you would put your license at risk by engaging in this kind of activity."

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September 3, 2006

For Sale By al-Queda

A for-sale-by-owner Web site that is registered to a loan officer in Ohio also contained a cache of information about a suspected al-Qaeda operative captured in Pakistan last year and an Islamic militant movement.

Pages embedded within The For Sale By Owner Association Inc. Web site, at www.fsboa.com, contained Arabic writings attributed to Abu Musab al-Suri (al-Suri translates as "The Syrian"), who is also known as Mustafa Setmarian Nasar. Nasar was reportedly arrested in Quetta, Pakistan, in November 2005 and is rumored to be in U.S. custody, though his location remains a secret.

Alan Isham, the creator of the Web site who is a loan officer for 1st Metropolitan Mortgage in Pepper Pike, Ohio, said he hadn’t added anything to the Web site for two years and had nothing to do with the Arabic-language materials at the site. "Somebody hacked into the site," he said. The www.fsboa.com Web site was registered in Isham’s name in 1998.

"I just had no idea it was even there. I haven’t uploaded anything into the site for over 24 months. It’s kind of a dead site."

The entry page to the For Sale By Owner Association Inc. site included links to property search, mortgage information, membership information and chat pages, and invited sellers to "post ads instantly" and to "advertise your property for free," though many of the links at the site were not functioning. There were no links from the site’s home page that connected directly to the Arabic content at the site.

Isham said he was told by government officials earlier this year not to take down the Web site.

"I was actually contacted by government officials and asked about (the site). I was asked to leave it be because they were monitoring it," Isham said Thursday. But the attention about the site is endangering his reputation, Isham said, adding that he has asked to shut the site down. As of this morning, the www.fsboa.com site was not active.

The site had contained links to dozens of pages of text and images of a sword and a quill pen. The Islamic militant materials within the Ohio-based FSBO Web site were publicized earlier this year in a March 28 article by the Jamestown Foundation, a public policy group that researches events and trends in societies considered "strategically or tactically important to the United States."

The foundation cited a statement by Nasar at the www.fsboa.com/vw Web site and reported that Nasar is "one of al-Qaeda’s top ideologues" and "has proved to be the movement’s most significant strategic brain."

In late August, conservative FrontPage Magazine and author and counter-terrorism consultant Laura Mansfield published information about the possible terrorist connections to the Ohio FSBO site on their Web sites.

U.S. officials have said that Nasar was a trainer at Osama bin Laden’s camps in Afghanistan. A Spanish citizen, Nasar was named in a Spanish indictment in 2003 for alleged terrorist activities connected to al-Qaeda. He also had spent time in London in the mid-1990s before traveling to Afghanistan, according to reports. A message last month attributed to Nasar called upon militant groups across Europe to "awaken" and "move fast" to carry out more terror attacks against Britain, according to news reports.

A Google Language Tools Arabic-to-English translation of materials that were posted at the www.fsboa.com/vw site appears to be a statement by Nasar refuting media reports and allegations by the U.S. government about the extent of his involvement in terrorist activities.

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July 18, 2006

MORTGAGE BROKERS NOT “CREDITORS” UNDER DIDMCA







Linda R. Sweeney brought suit against Savings First Mortgage, L.L.C. (Savings First) in the Circuit Court for Frederick County, alleging a violation of the Maryland Finder’s Fee Law. Md. Code (1975, 2000 Repl. Vol.), §§ 12-801 - 12-809 of the Commercial Law Article.1 Savings First acted as a mortgage broker for Ms. Sweeney in the procurement of two mortgage refinance loans within a one-year period. Ms. Sweeney alleged that the mortgage broker fee charged by Savings First in connection with the second loan was in violation of the Maryland statute, specifically § 12-804(c).2

__________________
1   
All citations in this opinion to the Maryland Code will be to this version of the Commercial Law Article in effect at the time of the operative facts of this case, unless otherwise specified.

__________________
2   
Section 12-804(c) states:
   

Mortgage loan obtained more than once on same property. - A mortgage broker obtaining a mortgage loan with respect to the same property more than once within a 24-month period may charge a finder’s fee only on so much of the loan as is in excess of the initial loan.

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Savings First responded to Ms. Sweeney’s suit by filing a motion to dismiss, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. In support of its motion, Savings First argued that the Finder’s Fee Law was preempted by § 501(a)(1) of the Federal Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act,3 and, in the alternative, was barred by the applicable Maryland one-year statute of limitations.4 The Circuit Court granted the motion, dismissing Ms. Sweeney’s complaint with prejudice based on its conclusion that § 1735f-7a of Title 12 of the United States Code preempted the Maryland statute. Ms. Sweeney noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. We granted certiorari, Sweeney v. Savings First Mortgage, L.L.C., 385 Md. 511, 869 A.2d 864 (2005), on our initiative while the appeal was pending in the intermediate appellate court, in order to consider the following question of first impression in this State:5

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3   

The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act is codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a (2000).
4   

Md. Code (1975, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 5-107 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provides that “[a] prosecution or suit for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture shall be instituted within one year after the offense was committed.”
5   

In considering an appeal on bypass of the intermediate appellate court, this Court considers only those issues that would have been properly before the Court of Special Appeals. Md. Rule 8-131(b)(2). See Converge Servs. Group, LLC v. Curran, 383 Md. 462, 467 n.1, 860 A.2d 871, 874 n.1 (2004).

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Is Maryland’s Finder’s Fee Law, and the limits it places on the fees that mortgage brokers may charge, preempted by the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA)?

Based on our analysis of the federal statute, and an investigation of the legislative history behind the DIDMCA, we hold that the Maryland Finder’s Fee Law is not preempted in this case. Accordingly, we shall reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court for Frederick County and remand this matter for further proceedings.
I.
A.

On 29 August 2000, Savings First acted as a mortgage broker in obtaining a refinance loan for Ms. Sweeney and Harry E. Stockman6 secured by a residence at 9204 Oak Tree Circle in Frederick, Maryland. The amount of the loan was $140,250 and the lender for the transaction was First Union National Bank of Delaware. As payment for its efforts in brokering the loan, Savings First received a mortgage broker fee of $8,427. The following year, on or about 12 July 2001, Savings First arranged a replacement mortgage refinance loan for the same residence for Ms. Sweeney and Mr. Stockman in the amount of $158,400. The lender in this second transaction was Concorde Acceptance Corporation (Concorde). The mortgage broker fee paid to Savings First in the second transaction was $10,788. The mortgage broker fee for each transaction was rolled into the amounts financed.

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6   

Mr. Stockman is not a party to this controversy.

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B.

Ms. Sweeney filed a complaint on 1 March 2004 in the Circuit Court for Frederick County seeking a judgment in the amount of $30,564 against Savings First.7 Ms. Sweeney contended that the maximum fee allowed by Maryland law for Savings First’s brokering of the second loan was $1,452, or 8% of $18,150, the amount of the second loan in excess of the first loan. The relevant portions of § 12-804 of the Maryland Finder’s Fee Law state:

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7   

Section 12-807 states:
   

Any mortgage broker who violates any provision of this subtitle shall forfeit to the borrower the greater of:
(1)   

Three times the amount of the finder’s fee collected; or
(2)   

The sum of $500.

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Fees mortgage broker permitted to charge.
   

(a) Maximum amount of finder’s fee. - A mortgage broker may charge a finder’s fee not in excess of 8 percent of the amount of the loan or advance.
* * * * *

(c) Mortgage loan obtained more than once on same property. - A mortgage broker obtaining a mortgage loan with respect to the same property more than once within a 24-month period may charge a finder’s fee only on so much of the loan as is in excess of the initial loan.

Md. Code, § 12-804.

Savings First filed its motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, on 14 May 2004. Savings First argued that Ms. Sweeney’s complaint stated no basis for relief because her claim was barred by law for either of two reasons. The first contention was that § 501(a)(1) of the DIDMCA expressly preempts application of the Maryland Finder’s Fee Law. Under this federal statute, a state is prohibited from “expressly limiting the rate or amount of interest, discount points, finance charges, or other charges” applying to qualifying mortgages. 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a(a)(1) (2000). Savings First’s alternate argument was that Ms. Sweeney’s claim was barred by the one-year statute of limitations applicable to penalties and forfeitures.8 Savings First included affidavits in support of its motion demonstrating particular facts, beyond those alleged in Ms. Sweeney’s complaint, that it contended were material and not in genuine dispute.

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8   

The Circuit Court held that the applicable statute of limitations was not one year, but did not opine what the correct applicable limitations period was. Savings First initially filed a cross-appeal in the Court of Special Appeals, but has not briefed or argued before us the limitations issue. Thus, we shall not address the statute of limitations question. See Ricker v. Abrams, 263 Md. 509, 516, 283 A.2d 583, 587 (1971) (stating that an issue not raised in the brief(s) or oral argument is waived); see also Md. Rule 8-504.

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At the conclusion of the motions hearing on 18 August 2004, the Circuit Court ostensibly granted the motion to dismiss Ms. Sweeney’s claim, with prejudice, because §1735f-7a preempted the cause of action brought under § 12-804 of the Maryland Commercial Law Article. In ruling on the motion, the Circuit Court did not state whether it had considered the additional facts offered by Savings First in its affidavits.9

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9   

We note also that although the order entered by the court did not specify whether the court was granting Savings First’s motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment, it was stated at the conclusion of the hearing that summary judgment was being granted. This was the proper procedural action under Maryland Rule 2-322(c). See Dual, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 383 Md. 151, 161, 857 A.2d 1095, 1100 (2004) (stating that, when factual allegations are presented beyond those alleged in the complaint, and consideration of same is not excluded expressly by the judge, the facial grant of a motion to dismiss will be treated for purposes of appellate review as the grant of summary judgment).

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