September 1, 2006
The Bubble Cycle is Replacing the Business Cycle
Maybe there’s a New Economy after all
by Eric Janszen
Let’s put to rest the myth that the Fed is blind to asset bubbles and never intentionally acts to prick them. The truth can be obtained by anyone with an internet browser and a few hours on their hands to read the voluminous Fed Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting minutes. In the FOMC meeting minutes from March 22, 1994 (pdf), Greenspan says (my emphasis in italics):
"When we moved on February 4th, I think our expectation was that we would prick the bubble in the equity markets. What in fact occurred is that, as evidence of the dramatic shift in the economic outlook began to emerge after we moved and long-term rates began to move up, we were also clearly getting a major upward increase in expectations of corporate earnings. While the stock market went down after our actions on February 4th, it has gone down really quite marginally on net over this period. So what has occurred is that while this capital gains bubble in all financial assets had to come down, instead of the decline being concentrated in the stock area, it shifted over into the bond area. But the effects are the same. These are major capital losses, which have required very dramatic changes in the actions and activities on the part of individuals and institutions."
"So the question is, having very consciously and purposely tried to break the bubble and upset the markets in order to sort of break the cocoon of capital gains speculation, we are now in a position—having done that and in a sense succeeded perhaps more than we had intended—to try to restore some degree of confidence in the System."
To try to restore some degree of confidence in "the System," as Greenspan calls it, the Fed injected liquidity in 1994 that restored function to a dysfunctional banking system and rescued the bond market. But what cures one bubble sows the seeds of new ones. As Martin Mayer said in his book The Fed: "The truth is that liquidity, the only significant weapon remaining in the central bank’s arsenal as decision making moves to the markets, will not necessarily go where you want it to go when you need it to go there."
The 1994 liquidity injection kicked off the largest and longest period of real estate appreciation in US history and launched the late 1990s stock market bubble in the bargain. Five years later, in June 1999, the Fed appears to have moved to prick the new stock market bubble in the same purposeful manner as in 1994, except you won’t find the same explicit discussion about pricking bubbles in the minutes of the June 30 FOMC meeting notes. The only reference to asset bubbles comes from the President of the Federal Reserve Banks of Boston, Cathy E. Minehan, during the previous month’s meeting (emphasis added):
"We recently held a meeting of the Bank’s Academic Advisory Council which, as you all know, includes two or three Nobel Prize winners and people from Harvard, MIT, Yale, and so forth. The discussion focused on issues related to productivity growth, labor market tightness, and asset market bubbles. The group was lively, to say the least. But some consensus was reached on the need for action that might take the wind out of asset markets, even in the absence of tighter monetary policy, perhaps through increased margin requirements or increased supervisory oversight on credit extended, particularly in the day trading operations."

She also commented on "excesses and imbalances" in the "stock markets, real estate markets, corporate and personal debt." If there was concern around the FOMC in 1999 about real estate excesses, you have to wonder what the FOMC thinks today. The median home price in California is up 123 percent since then. That’s close to the median home price increase for the US in the previous 20 years, from 1980 to 1999.
We won’t know for a while what committee members think because the full minutes of FOMC meetings are released after a five-year lag, but two things appear to have changed since 1994. First, there has been an apparent shift in the policy of talking about bubbles openly in committee meetings. Second, the Fed now appears to wait until the latest bubble has become considerably more egregious than the previous one. But otherwise the responses and results are the same.
Nine months after the Fed began to withdraw liquidity from the markets (starting in June 1999), the bubble popped in March 2000. The Fed then beat the previous post-bubble Fed rate cut record of 4% in 14 months, from 6% to 2%, that followed the 1929 crash. Between January 2001 and June 2003, the Fed flushed the System with liquidity once again as the Fed Funds Rate target was cut from 6.5% to 1%.
After more than four years of post stock market bubble collapse reflation, with short term interest rates kept below the rate of inflation, it appears that liquidity once again did "not necessarily go where you want it to go," resulting in the creation of bubbles in several asset classes. Unique to this bubble period, several asset classes that have historically been counter-cyclical, such as bonds and equities, are all rising in tandem. Now we have:
A Housing Bubble
A Bond Bubble
A Private Equity Bubble
A Hedge Fund Bubble
A Commodities Bubble
An Art Bubble
All asset classes can’t rise together forever. These bubbles too will eventually collapse. Then it’s reflation time again.
Ever since markets overran the Fed in the creation of money and credit in the late 1970s, the Fed has overseen a series of bubble booms and bubble busts. Market professionals, especially hedge fund managers, have learned how to position themselves to profit from these boom and bust cycles. Speculators are now well-trained and will be standing by; ready, willing, and able to turn the next post-bust liquidity flow of money their way.
Read More….ITulip
President George W. Bush’s "ownership society" is a seductive idea: who wouldn’t want to become the owner of their home, health care, retirement, and destiny? From the "home on the range" to the adulation heaped on high-tech entrepreneurs, the concept is rooted in the American experience. No other nation places more value on the importance of individual autonomy. Ultimately, however, Bush’s promise of an ownership society is an empty one. In exchange for ownership, we receive increased risk while the wealthy and corporate interests benefit, as in his Social Security privatization plan. In Bush’s world, everyone gets a little piece of the pie, but at the cost of giving the wealthy extremely large helpings. Bush has, in fact, exacerbated a long-running trend: not only is income inequality greater in the United States than in any other advanced society, but the ownership of wealth is literally feudal in nature–and getting more so. The top 1 percent garners more income than the bottom 100 million Americans taken together. A mere 1 percent of wealth-holders, however, own just under half of all financial assets. A slightly larger group, the top 5 percent, own roughly 70 percent of all business assets. In 2003, the top 1 percent alone received 57.5 percent of all capital gains, rent, interest, and dividend income.







