by Eric Janszen
August 31, 2006
By giving my last Quick Comment the title
The Fed: Dishonest or Incompetent? I left forum members to choose between corruption and stupidity to explain the Fed’s behavior over the past ten years or so, more or less forcing a lively debate. We got that in spades.
I’d say that to the question, "Is the Fed dishonest or incompetent?" the consensus answer among the iTulip community so far is a resounding: "Yes!"
This thread has also generated more conspiracy theory discussion than we usually get here at iTulip. That’s not surprising. After all, if the Fed is behaving in a way that appears dishonest and incompetent, it’s fair to wonder why. Nefarious motives inevitably come up.
As long time readers of the site know, I’m not a fan of conspiracy theories, and for the usual reasons. Conspiracies are impractical; they require many players to achieve broad goals and fool the crowd over a long period of time and that’s hard to pull off. Sooner rather than later someone in the "cabal" gets out of line and blows the whole game, thwarted factions break off to work against the group, and so on. Conspiracies require secrecy, covert operational brilliance, hidden central organization. In these days of Internet transparency especially, these are harder than ever to acheive.
Generally, where many see a conspiracy, I see a system, and where others might see a random event, I see a step in a process.
I view asset bubbles as systems, and their rise and collapse as more or less predictable processes. I was perhaps the first to identify the Internet Bubble as an asset bubble system, and compare it to the tulip mania in Holland in the 1600s.
I watched that particular bubble in action close up, and it continues to this day in the form of an echo bubble in Web 2.0 companies like MySpace.
The tech stock bubble was not a conspiracy. A bunch of VCs did not gather weekly in a room, drinking port and smoking cigars, scheming about how to rig things to sell worthless stock to suckers in the public markets. The bubble got started when someone made some money in an unexpected way. The IPO of Netscape is often cited as the firing gun. Then others imitated them by forming similar companies and tried to replicate what they did. Several succeeded. VCs started throwing money at new similar companies, and variants emerged, and they too got funded. The SEC let many of these companies go public, but should not have. The Fed allowed speculators to buy these stocks on margin, but should not have. An awestruck press covered the incredible money deals, fueling greater investor interest, but should have been more critical. I can assure you that at no time did a group of VCs gather with the SEC and some investment bankers in a dark room to figure out how to run this racket. But, I will tell you that some did sit together, quietly in the corner of a bar in Palo Alto or Boston or New York City, and after a couple of glasses of wine, say, "I can’t believe we’re getting away with this."
As the system of financing, investing, promotion, public offerings, and the re-investing of money thus generated went on, more VCs, investors, press and so on, piled in, and the bigger it got. Soon you had a self reinforcing system generating its own money, no fuel from the Fed required. Even those VCs that were skeptical of the longevity of this bubble system were forced to participate as their limited partners (investors) pounded on the table demanding, "Where’s my Netscape? How come we don’t have one of those!" One might reply, "It’s a bubble, Sir. Maybe we can make you lots of money or maybe it’ll pop and we’ll loose your money." That, while true, was the wrong answer. Any partner of a VC firm who conveyed this truth was simply not with the program, and had limited career opportunities with the firm and probably the industry at the time.
So it goes today with so-called hedge funds, what I call USIPs (Unregulated Speculative Investment Pools, because true hedge funds of old were hedged, long one thing and short a correlated other, whereas many so-called hedge funds today are merely long and are hedged only insofar as they have taken out some insurance in the form of some kind of derivative that is supposed to protect their bets from catastrophic losses).
SEC officials nod their heads in agreement with representatives of the hedge fund industry, acquiessing to the idea that regulation isn’t required because it will be "bad for investors" or "bad for the industry" or "bad for the world" and "there are enough laws on the books already" and "it’s all so complicated… we don’t know how." And, blah, blah, blah. Even as they cheer the SEC’s wisdom to abdicate their responsibility as regulators, I can see a hedge fund manager eating dinner in the back yard of his Norwalk, Connecticut estate this weekend, and after a couple of glasses of wine, leaning forward to get closer to one of his guests who is an investor in his fund, and whispering, "I can’t believe we’re getting away with this."
No conspiracy but certainly a system, and a process. At this point, the hedge fund bubble system is going through a several stage process of collapse. So is the housing bubble, although the two are not directly related. One is the
rich man’s bubble, the other the every-man’s bubble.
Brings us back to the question of motive. Why allow these systems to develop? Why did the SEC allow all those dot coms to go public? Why is 27 year old Zachary R. George of
Pirate Capital allowed to bully the 55 year old CEO of Cornell Companies? Is that really good for the country? Why is it fair to
use public funds to bail out LTCM when the payees had no opportunity to reap any of the benefits?
Sometimes the most simple answer is the right one. It will surprise you, and I’ve come to this conclusion after meeting literally hundreds of these guys, and I do mean guys. Precious few women inhabit The System.
It comes down to culture.
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