January 27, 2007

Two giants creating the biggest mortgage group in the US.

Posted by MAX

Bank of America and Countrywide Financial have held discussions about an alliance that would create the biggest mortgage lending group in the US, people close to the matter said.

The talks are said to be at an early stage and may not lead to a deal. But if they proceed, the negotiations could lead to a joint venture between the two companies, under which BofA would use its big branch network to help sell home mortgages originated by Countrywide. Countrywide would have the support of BofA’s far bigger balance sheet to fund its lending.

The talks could also lead to an acquisition of Countrywide by BofA, which is eager to expand its mortgage lending business to match its breadth in credit cards. Such an acquisition would probably cost BofA, the second-biggest US bank, about $30bn (£15bn), analysts said.

The talks indicate that BofA continues to focus on expansion in the US in spite of recent reports that it might be interested in buying UK bank Barclays. Ken Lewis, chief executive, has said a major foreign acquisition would be difficult for BofA to execute.

BofA said it did not comment on market rumour. Countrywide did not respond to a request for comment.

Countrywide shares soared 11 per cent after FT.com disclosed a possible alliance. They closed up 4.2 per cent at $42.00. BofA shares fell slightly to $52.04.

Banking analysts said a deal could make sense for both sides. BofA would dramatically expand its ability to serve consumers, while Countrywide would get the financial muscle to withstand the current slowdown in the mortgage business.

"This would cement Bank of America’s lead as the dominant retail bank in the US," said Gerard Cassidy, banking analyst at RBC Capital Markets. He added that even if BofA were to buy Countrywide outright it could avoid violating the US law forbidding banks from having more than 10 per cent of consumer deposits following an acquisition.

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December 26, 2006

Ferraris on Wall Street

It’s a brisk Wednesday morning in the windy caverns of Wall Street and Sarah Clark’s toes are cold.

For Those With a Few Million to Spend Dressed in a purple flight attendant outfit, Ms. Clark, a 26-year-old model, is trying to entice recent bonus recipients at Goldman Sachs into using a charter plane service, handing out $1,000 discount coupons to people in front of the investment bank’s Broad Street headquarters.

“Where am I going?” asks one man, heading toward the Goldman building. “It’s your own private jet,” says Ms. Clark with a smile. “You can go wherever you like.”

For Wall Street’s elite, the sky may well be the limit.

In recent weeks, immense riches have been rained upon the top bankers and traders. After a year of record profits, investment houses like Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers and Morgan Stanley are awarding bonuses as high as $60 million. And a select group of hedge fund managers and private equity executives may be taking home even more.

That is serious money. And the serious luxury goods markets are feeling the impact.

Miller Motorcars, in Greenwich, Conn., is fielding more requests for the $250,000 Ferrari 599 GTB Fiorano than it can possibly fill. One real estate broker laments a dearth of listings for two clients trying to spend $20 million on Manhattan properties. Financiers already comfortably settled in multimillion-dollar apartments and town houses are buying $5 million apartments for their children. Vacation homes, usually bought and sold in the spring, are now hot this winter, including ones in private resorts like the Yellowstone Club in Montana near Yellowstone National Park.

“Last year, everybody bought Ducatis,” said one investment banker, referring to the Italian motorcycle. “This year it’s vacations. I’m on my way to St. Barts,” he said, en route to the airport. Like most bankers, he spoke on the condition that he not be identified, because he was not authorized to talk to a reporter by his company.

The 2006 bonus gold rush has re-energized some luxury markets. The Manhattan real estate market, for example, had softened; sales of apartments fell 17 percent in the third quarter this year compared with a year ago, according to the Corcoran Group.

Then came bonus day. Last week, Michele Kleier, president of Gumley Haft Kleier, received a call from a hedge fund manager in his late 30s. He had spent $6 million on an apartment two years ago and, with his bonus, wanted to upgrade. His new price range? “Not more than $20 million.”

Ed Petrie, a broker at Sotheby’s in East Hampton, N.Y., is now fielding two bids for $8 million to $10 million properties in exclusive Georgica Pond — properties that have been on the market since the spring. “The fall was relatively slow and then suddenly, with news on bonuses, there has been quite a bit of activity,” he said.

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December 22, 2006

A Chicken in Every Pot and a Car in Every Garage

THIS QUOTE, attributed to President Herbert Hoover’s 1928 election campaign, epitomizes the mass psychology characteristic of the Roaring ’20s. In a country that had long enjoyed a remarkable period of prosperity, it was felt that the trajectory of the boom’s trend would eventually lead to an eradication of poverty.

The Industrial Revolution brought about a tremendous increase in productive capacity and living standards beginning with its origins in the mid-19th century. But the advent of consumer installment credit in the Roaring ’20s was the mechanism that shifted business into overdrive. Entrepreneurs all along the chain of production, from commodities to retail, geared up for demand that, in hindsight, was short-lived.A credit-fueled bubble that affected nearly every corner of the economy — encompassing everything from consumer credit, to business loans, to margin debt at stock brokerages — crested the following summer. Alas, historians have thoroughly documented what happened when this euphoria morphed into panic.

With the onset of the Great Depression, priorities for many gradually shifted from return on capital, to return OF capital, to concern that modern industrialized society was unraveling at its seams.

The Consequences of a Credit Bubble

As the panic that engulfed Wall Street spread to the banking community, pain that was previously only felt by those involved in the speculative stock market quickly consumed the business community. Consumers reined in spending, so business owners rationally cut expansion plans and investments in inventory.

Bankers comprised the heart of the capital allocation function of the time period; in the modern global economy, it’s quite another story, as the business of providing credit has shifted toward such institutions as hedge funds, private equity, and government-sponsored enterprises like Fannie Mae. Also taking share from bankers has been the secondary market for credit derivatives, including mortgage-backed securities, collateralized debt obligations, and collateralized loan obligations.

Take the example of mortgage-backed securities: pools of mortgages of similar size, credit risk profile, and loan-to-value ratios that provide a yield similar to that of a bond. It used to be that you’d apply at your local community bank for a 30-year mortgage where you’d make monthly principal and interest payments over the entire life of the loan. The banker carefully weighed the risks of extending the mortgage on the home you sought to purchase and the sustainability of your present income because he would have to live with the consequences of default.

Over the course of the past 5-10 years, however, the financial system has evolved to the point where bankers have more incentive to sell the right to collect your future monthly payments into a secondary market. This secondary market is created by large Wall Street firms who make commissions and fees in a fashion similar to that of the stock market. Therefore, the local banker has been transformed into an agent of institutional and individual investors looking to invest in an income-producing security that pays a yield greater than Treasury bonds.

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September 1, 2006

Jocks and Geeks Theory of Financial System Dysfunction


by Eric Janszen

August 31, 2006

By giving my last Quick Comment the title The Fed: Dishonest or Incompetent? I left forum members to choose between corruption and stupidity to explain the Fed’s behavior over the past ten years or so, more or less forcing a lively debate. We got that in spades.

I’d say that to the question, "Is the Fed dishonest or incompetent?" the consensus answer among the iTulip community so far is a resounding: "Yes!"

This thread has also generated more conspiracy theory discussion than we usually get here at iTulip. That’s not surprising. After all, if the Fed is behaving in a way that appears dishonest and incompetent, it’s fair to wonder why. Nefarious motives inevitably come up.

As long time readers of the site know, I’m not a fan of conspiracy theories, and for the usual reasons. Conspiracies are impractical; they require many players to achieve broad goals and fool the crowd over a long period of time and that’s hard to pull off. Sooner rather than later someone in the "cabal" gets out of line and blows the whole game, thwarted factions break off to work against the group, and so on. Conspiracies require secrecy, covert operational brilliance, hidden central organization. In these days of Internet transparency especially, these are harder than ever to acheive.

Generally, where many see a conspiracy, I see a system, and where others might see a random event, I see a step in a process.

I view asset bubbles as systems, and their rise and collapse as more or less predictable processes. I was perhaps the first to identify the Internet Bubble as an asset bubble system, and compare it to the tulip mania in Holland in the 1600s.

I watched that particular bubble in action close up, and it continues to this day in the form of an echo bubble in Web 2.0 companies like MySpace.

The tech stock bubble was not a conspiracy. A bunch of VCs did not gather weekly in a room, drinking port and smoking cigars, scheming about how to rig things to sell worthless stock to suckers in the public markets. The bubble got started when someone made some money in an unexpected way. The IPO of Netscape is often cited as the firing gun. Then others imitated them by forming similar companies and tried to replicate what they did. Several succeeded. VCs started throwing money at new similar companies, and variants emerged, and they too got funded. The SEC let many of these companies go public, but should not have. The Fed allowed speculators to buy these stocks on margin, but should not have. An awestruck press covered the incredible money deals, fueling greater investor interest, but should have been more critical. I can assure you that at no time did a group of VCs gather with the SEC and some investment bankers in a dark room to figure out how to run this racket. But, I will tell you that some did sit together, quietly in the corner of a bar in Palo Alto or Boston or New York City, and after a couple of glasses of wine, say, "I can’t believe we’re getting away with this."

As the system of financing, investing, promotion, public offerings, and the re-investing of money thus generated went on, more VCs, investors, press and so on, piled in, and the bigger it got. Soon you had a self reinforcing system generating its own money, no fuel from the Fed required. Even those VCs that were skeptical of the longevity of this bubble system were forced to participate as their limited partners (investors) pounded on the table demanding, "Where’s my Netscape? How come we don’t have one of those!" One might reply, "It’s a bubble, Sir. Maybe we can make you lots of money or maybe it’ll pop and we’ll loose your money." That, while true, was the wrong answer. Any partner of a VC firm who conveyed this truth was simply not with the program, and had limited career opportunities with the firm and probably the industry at the time.

So it goes today with so-called hedge funds, what I call USIPs (Unregulated Speculative Investment Pools, because true hedge funds of old were hedged, long one thing and short a correlated other, whereas many so-called hedge funds today are merely long and are hedged only insofar as they have taken out some insurance in the form of some kind of derivative that is supposed to protect their bets from catastrophic losses).

SEC officials nod their heads in agreement with representatives of the hedge fund industry, acquiessing to the idea that regulation isn’t required because it will be "bad for investors" or "bad for the industry" or "bad for the world" and "there are enough laws on the books already" and "it’s all so complicated… we don’t know how." And, blah, blah, blah. Even as they cheer the SEC’s wisdom to abdicate their responsibility as regulators, I can see a hedge fund manager eating dinner in the back yard of his Norwalk, Connecticut estate this weekend, and after a couple of glasses of wine, leaning forward to get closer to one of his guests who is an investor in his fund, and whispering, "I can’t believe we’re getting away with this."

No conspiracy but certainly a system, and a process. At this point, the hedge fund bubble system is going through a several stage process of collapse. So is the housing bubble, although the two are not directly related. One is the rich man’s bubble, the other the every-man’s bubble.

Brings us back to the question of motive. Why allow these systems to develop? Why did the SEC allow all those dot coms to go public? Why is 27 year old Zachary R. George of Pirate Capital allowed to bully the 55 year old CEO of Cornell Companies? Is that really good for the country? Why is it fair to use public funds to bail out LTCM when the payees had no opportunity to reap any of the benefits?

Sometimes the most simple answer is the right one. It will surprise you, and I’ve come to this conclusion after meeting literally hundreds of these guys, and I do mean guys. Precious few women inhabit The System.

It comes down to culture.

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