August 4, 2006

Peer-To-Peer Lending

I first wrote about Zopa.com last December and predicted an American version would be entering the market shortly. Prosper.com was launched early this year and it is beginning to get publicity:

Newsweek Magazine’s Tip Sheet section last week featured two Web sites that have nothing to do with real estate or mortgage financing but may illustrate the future of the mortgage lending game.

Prosper.com is based in San Francisco and Zopa.com is British based. They operate on the principal that people needing to borrow money and those wanting to lend it are better off dealing directly (a relative term) with each other rather than using banks or other middle-men. Each, for a fee of course, are trying to facilitate this person-to-person lending while providing safeguards and services to both sides of the transaction. Each site, however, approaches the task in a slightly different way.

Zopa.com, is not yet available, or at least widely available in the U.S. They have received substantial venture capitol to start up in California "within the year," but that announcement was undated. It is the more straightforward of the two sites but the business plans don’t deviate all that much.

Borrowers in need of money post their specs - $3,000 to consolidate credit card debt or $9,000 for a piece of equipment to expand a small company - and lenders bid for the business. It is all done anonymously and borrowers are not inundated with emails and telephone calls as are borrowers registering with traditional on-line lending companies. Loans are limited to three years and $25,000 on Prosper.com and up to 60 months on Zopa although we saw no ceiling loan amount. Both companies vet potential borrowers by checking credit and identity and both provide collection services.

Lenders through Prosper can choose to bid on financing an entire loan request or to take a piece of the debt thus spreading the risk of an individual loan among a number of lenders. The lowest rate offered wins but one would assume that a borrower could end up with a blended rate with one lender offering to take half of a $2000 loan at 7 percent with the remainder spread among ten lenders each offering to finance $100 at 8 percent. Zopa.com spreads all of its loans across lenders so that a number of investors own a piece of each loan. A $500 investment would be spread across a minimum of 50 loans.

The two services appear very different on line but both share an attribute of being limited in the information they provide; Zopa because it has a small site and Prosper because its site drowns the visitor in details. After a lot of searching it seems that an investor can transfer as little as $25 or as much as $100,000 into its lending account and that the minimum one can lend on Zopa is £10 but I remain confused about how the two major embellishments by Prosper actually work.

Prosper encourages its borrowers to join borrowing groups. The theory is that people will be more likely to repay their obligations if the reputation of their group is at stake. Anyone (who qualifies with a verifiable name, bank account and Social Security number) can start a group or join an existing group that matches their interests or philosophy. If group members display a high degree of responsibility managing their individual debts then the group will qualify for more advantageous rates in the future. The group leader also becomes a first line enforcer in the collections process. In addition, the group leader receives cash rewards for every loan that is funded and for every timely payment. The leader can choose to keep the rewards or to share them on a sliding scale from 25 percent to 100 percent with group members in the form of lower loan payments. The kicker, of course, is that groups where the rewards are shared are going to attract more members.

Groups are categorized as "arts and cultural," "religious and spiritual," "hobbies and clubs," "military" and a dozen other designations. A total of 2,461 groups are listed across the various categories but there is a good deal of overlap with some groups listing themselves several different ways and a few appearing in every category. Membership in the various groups such as "Foolish Loans" made up of subscribers to the Motley Fool investment site, Christian Stewards, Homeschoolers, Government employers, and so forth, ranged from one person (the lonely group organizer) up to nearly two thousand.

At the group level was where Prosper got very confusing. It appears that many of the borrowers groups are also lenders. Every one we looked at had money available for lending but a number of groups had exactly the same amount available - to the penny. We visited every link (and there are dozens) trying to get an explanation of this without success. Reading between the lines it would appear that many of the groups were formed by traditional lending/finance companies. Before deciding to borrow or lend it would be good to get this relationship examined.

The interest rates are nothing to write home about either. Prosper lists historical interest rates for AA credit borrowers at 7.73 percent to 12.61 percent depending on loan amount. Different borrowers groups quote different rates but at least one advises that, for planning purposes the borrower should add an additional 3 to 4 percent to the estimate.

If, in spite of their warts, these websites work for relatively small, unsecured, and primarily personal loans it is easy to see other entrepreneurs entering the market and eventually starting up services for homeowners to finance purchases or refinances. Such sites could ultimately supplant Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac or perhaps the two corporations will be quick enough on their feet to start such a service themselves, opening up particularly the lending end of the mortgage business to small investors who could profit from the relative safety of a type of secured investing which is usually not available to them. The format offers both an opportunity and a real threat for mortgage companies which currently qualify and package loans.

It is not such a stretch to see a prospective homebuyer logging on to (example) Helpmebuy.com or some such with a request for the $250,000 he figures he needs to buy a home and the rate he is willing to pay and be pre-approved by a single lender or 1,000 of them in a matter of hours. This would truly be "lenders bidding for your business," and would give both borrowers and lenders more control while not upsetting the current well-established availability of home purchase funds or the mechanisms for servicing the funded loan.

Peer to peer lending, it’s a brave new world.



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Mortgage Jobs Increase




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Consumption, Credit and Housing Wealth

There is widespread disagreement about the role of housing wealth in explaining consumption. Much of the empirical literature is marred by poor controls for the common drivers both of house prices and consumption, including income, income growth expectations, interest rates, credit supply conditions, other assets and indicators of income uncertainty (such as changes in the unemployment rate). For instance, while the easing of credit supply conditions is usually followed by a house price boom, failure to control for the direct effect of credit liberalization on consumption can over-estimate the effect of housing wealth or collateral on consumption.

In their new paper Housing Wealth, Credit Conditions and Consumption, Janine Aron and John Muellbauer put forward an empirical model grounded in theory with more complete controls than hitherto used. They study consumption in the UK and South Africa. Both countries experienced substantial credit market liberalization and rising consumption to income ratios. However, South Africa’s circumstances in the 1980s prevented an asset price boom, thus allowing the illumination of the direct role of credit liberalization. The paper incorporates methodological improvements in the measurement of credit conditions, and also clarifies the multi-faceted effects of credit liberalization on consumption.

The Bank of England still appears to be uncertain about the effect of house prices on consumption and its new macro-econometric model has already seriously broken down in modelling this effect. Our new paper explains why the correlation between consumption and house price growth in the UK shifted since 2000 and what the many factors are which influence this correlation. The paper finds that over a two year horizon, a £100 increase in housing wealth now raises spending by around £3, much the same as an increase in stock market wealth. Before credit conditions were liberalised, the housing wealth effect was far less and this suggests that the use of housing collateral for increasing debt is the main way housing wealth affects consumption.

Their paper uses the Credit Conditions Index (CCI) constructed by Emilio Fernandez-Corugedo and John Muellbauer in Consumer Credit Conditions in the United Kingdom. Credit supply conditions faced by UK consumers, particularly in the mortgage market, have been liberalised since the late 1970s, with implications for the housing market and consumer spending. This paper examines quarterly micro data from the Survey of Mortgage Lenders to learn about changes in credit conditions from loan to value ratios (LVRs) and loan to income ratios (LIRs) of first-time buyers (classified by region and age). It combines data on the proportions of high LVR and high LIR loans with aggregate information on UK consumer credit and mortgage debt to give ten quarterly series for 1975-2001. These are modelled in a ten-equation system. A comprehensive set of economic and demographic influences on the demand and supply of credit, applying relevant sign restrictions, are controlled for. A single time-varying index of credit conditions captures the common variation in the ten credit indicators which cannot be explained by the economic and demographic controls. The broad coverage of credit market indicators and thorough investigation of economic forces driving the credit market should make the resulting credit conditions index more robust than previous estimates. The index increases in the 1980s, peaking towards the end of the decade. It retraces part of this rise in the early 1990s, before increasing again to levels, for the preferred measure, exceeding the previous peak. The index is useful for understanding the growth in household debt, for modelling consumption (see discussion above) and the housing market (see the UK housing bubbles paper by Gavin Cameron, John Muellbauer and Anthony Murphy), and for interpreting current monetary conditions.

A precursor of this paper is John Muellbauer’s Measuring Financial Liberalization in the UK Mortgage Market, presented at the European Meeting of the Econometric Society in 1997. This paper analysed data on loan to values from building societies for first time buyers in 11 regions from 1971 to 1995 with exactly the same object in mind as the recent paper with Emilio Fernandez-Corugedo. The recent paper solves the problems uncovered in the 1997 paper, specifically the fact that building societies became less representative of the mortgage market when this market was being transformed by new entrants in the 1980s.

The first attempt to estimate a consumer credit conditions index was in John Muellbauer and Anthony Murphy’s Income Expectations, Wealth and Demography in The Aggregate UK Consumption Function presented at HM Treasury’s Academic Panel in 1993. Their ‘flib’ index, based on the analysis of average loan to value ratios (LVRs) in the United Kingdom for first-time buyers from the 5% Sample of Building Society Mortgages. Effectively the method involved regressing the log average LVR on the log of the mortgage interest rate, the log house price to income ratio and the real mortgage interest rate, for 1969-80 data, and using post-1980 dummies as a measure of the easing of credit conditions due to financial liberalisation. Among the innovations in this paper were the interaction effects between ‘flib’ and the illiquid wealth to income ratio, and the use of forecast income growth rates to proxy permanent income. The paper suggested that the marginal propensity to spend out of illiquid financial wealth and housing wealth were similar, at around 0.04. It seems likely that the slightly lower figure of 0.03 found in Aron and Muellbauer’s 2006 paper above reflects the role that asset prices play in their income forecasting equation, missing in this 1993 paper.

Housing Outlook


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Questions For Housing Optimists

Ten Questions for Optimists:

  
1. How will a pause help flippers stuck in "Soft Market Debris" that they can not sell? Where is pent up demand?
   2. How will a pause help homebuilders who can not sell current inventory let alone the stuff they keep building?
   3. How will a pause help lenders who keep throwing money down this sinkhole?
   4. What would a rate cut of even a full point do? Would rate cuts necessarily drive down mortgage rates when bankruptcies and foreclosures are soaring?
   5. Will a pause or even a series of cuts change consumer psychology? If so why?
   6. Even if prices stabilize where is job growth going to come from?
   7. Where is wage growth going to come from?
   8. What are real estate agents going to do if prices level off but sales do not pick up?
   9. What is everyone going to do with all those second homes they do not need?
  10. What will REOs do to prices when lenders dump them on the market?

I have a bonus question: How prepared is the housing industry for the "Big R" that is about ready to hit? I am of course referring to a recession. It is coming. For many real estate agents it is right here right now (and it might last for years).

The Chicago Tribune is reporting Mortgage applications at lowest in 4 years.

    From Tribune news services
    Published August 3, 2006

    WASHINGTON — Mortgage applications in the U.S. fell last week to the lowest level in more than four years as home purchases declined for a third straight week.

    The Mortgage Bankers Association said Wednesday that its index of applications to buy a home or refinance an existing loan dropped 1.2 percent from the previous week, to 527.6, the lowest reading since May 2002.

    The group’s gauge of purchase applications fell 3.3 percent, to 376.2, the lowest level since November 2003.

    The drop in loan volume comes as little surprise to most analysts, according to Frank Nothaft, chief economist at Freddie Mac.

    "On the whole, we expect lower origination volume throughout the year. It may not fall week by week and it may pick up a little bit at times, but we expect a decline," he said.

    With a weakening housing market forecast to restrain the economy through year’s end, Federal Reserve policymakers might find it easier to stop raising interest rates, economists said. They have raised their benchmark rate 17 straight times since June 2004, to 5.25 percent. They next meet on Tuesday.

    Although the central bank has indicated a pause in interest rate hikes is near, the effects of the increases will ripple through the economy for at least the next year, Nothaft said, which will continue to affect mortgage volume.

    "We’re projecting to see mortgage rates on average in 2007 remain above 2006 averages," he said. "So, expect to see a decline in mortgage volume through 2006 and into 2007."

If this is the bottom then let’s see Ten Answers.
Most Realtors as well as the National Association of Homebuilders are still in denial (at least publicly) about what is happening. Most still deny there was a bubble even as it explodes in their faces. Most talking heads seem to be expecting turnaround later this year, and if that does not happen then a turnaround for sure in 2007.

I have some news items for Lereah and all the rest of the cheerleaders to consider:

    * Twenty year bull markets do not bottom in half a year or even three years.
    * Home prices do not always go up.
    * Homes are not affordable by any reasonable measure that includes wages and rental prices.
    * It was bubble psychology and loose lending standards not demographics that allowed home prices to get 4-5 standard deviations above wage increases and rental prices. All bubbles eventually burst. This one just did and the aftermath will not be pretty.
    * Most of the gains in prices since 2000 are likely to be given up, if not a lot more.
    * Condo prices in the biggest bubble areas will fall in half if not more.
    * We are just now seeing the start of foreclosures and bankruptcies.
    * Things will get a lot worse before they get any better.
    * An overall panic has not yet hit. It will.


Mish



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